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[T]he rules are but tools to be used in procedural conduct aimed at the
objective of accomplishing justice. They are not ends within themselves, but
are means to that end.'
In contrast with this laudable objective stands the fact that during the
survey period2 the decisions announced in more than five hundred and
fifty Texas appellate opinions turned in whole or in part upon a ruling
upon a procedural matter. A thorough, current knowledge of procedure is
obviously an indispensable prerequisite to the conduct of litigation.
Jurisdiction over the Person. A surprising dearth of case authority still
exists nine years after the enactment of the Texas Long Arm Statute, ar-
ticle 2031b, and six years after the adoption of a Texas special appear-
ance practice, rule 120a. Although the Texas Supreme Court has yet to
define the outer limits of the extraterritorial reach of article 2031b, the
federal courts have already all but laid the constitutional issues to rest.
In Cherokee Laboratories, Inc. v. Rotary Drilling Services, Inc.' the
Fifth Circuit upheld long arm service of process by holding that an al-
legation of a conspiracy "to be performed in part in Texas" was sufficient
to confer in personam jurisdiction under section 4 of article 203 lb.4 That
section defines "engaging in business" as the "entering into contract by
mail or otherwise with a resident of Texas to be performed in whole or in
part by either party in this State, or the committing of any tort in whole
or in part in this State." The constitutional issues, having previously been
decided by the Fifth Circuit,' were not even given passing mention.
Rule 120a must be strictly followed in Texas courts to avoid a general
appearance waiving the right to challenge jurisdiction. A court of civil
appeals' held that a "motion to dismiss" filed along with a pleading la-
beled "special appearance and motion to quash service of process" amounted
to a general appearance.
Another court of civil appeals held that rule 120a may only be used
to challenge the power of Texas courts to acquire jurisdiction, and that it
may not be used to challenge a clerical error in the citation.7
In a case of first impression a court of civil appeals held that Texas
does not recognize a common law immunity from service of process, af-
forded in a majority of jurisdictions, to parties and witnesses while in the
* B.B.A., J.D., Southern Methodist University. Lecturer, Southern Methodist University; At-
torney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
'Brightwell v. Rabeck, 430 S.W.2d 252, 257 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.; see
TEx. R. Civ. P. 1.
Volumes 418 through 430, South Western Reporter, Second Series.
a383 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1967).4 TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b, § 4 (1964).
'Atwood Hatcheries v. Heisdorf & Nelson Farms, 357 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1966).
6Austin Rankin Corp. v. Cadillac Pool Corp., 421 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
7Long v. State, 423 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
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state for the purpose of conducting other litigation.8 The court did, how-
ever, offer dicta that such immunity would be granted to parties and wit-
nesses present in Texas for the purpose of contesting jurisdiction under
rule 120a. To hold otherwise would have emasculated the protection of
the special appearance practice, since an additional citation could be served
upon the specially appearing party to cure any defect in the original
service.
In French v. Brown' the supreme court held that after the appearance
of the defendant, the failure to give him notice of a setting on a motion
for summary judgment did not deprive the court of jurisdiction. The
judgment, although erroneous, was not void, and after the appellate time
limits had expired it could only be challenged by way of a bill of re-
view.1"
Default Judgments and Bills of Review. New rule 239a" requires the
clerk to give the defendant written notice of the entry of a default judg-
ment. Two separate duties are created by the rule: (1) certification of the
defendant's last known mailing address by the plaintiff's attorney, and
(2) written notice by the clerk. The rule itself is silent about the rights
of a defaulting defendant upon the failure to give the required notice.
Ordinarily, he may obtain relief by way of a bill of review only by
meeting all three requirements set out in Alexander v. Hagedorn" that he:
(1) show a meritorious defense, (2) which he was prevented from mak-
ing by the fraud, accident or wrongful act of the opposite party, (3) un-
mixed by any fault or negligence of his own. In view of rule 239a, a
civil appeals decision engrafted an additional exception"a upon the Alex-
ander v. Hagedorn requirements. It was held that the defaulting defend-
ant, even though not misled by an overt misstatement of the clerk, was
still entitled to maintain a bill of review without showing that it was
prevented from answering because of the fraud, accident or wrongful act
of the opposite party since the clerk had failed to give the required notice
of the judgment."' Other decisions, not involving rule 239a, have rigidly
continued to follow the requirements of Alexander v. Hagedorn.5
A court of civil appeals affirmed the denial of a motion for new
trial attacking the amount of a deficiency judgment rendered by default
after the sale of repossessed property."' The theory upon which relief was
'Oates v. Blackburn, 430 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
0 424 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. 1967).
"0This holding stands in contrast to the thinking in City of Houston v. Parkinson, 419 S.W.2d
900 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), that constructive notice of a hearing on street improvements does not
satisfy the requirements of due process when it is practicable to give actual notice.
1 TEx. R. Civ. P. 239a.
'2148 Tex. 656, 226 S.W.2d 996 (1950).
"' The requirements of Alexander v. Hagedorn, id., have been previously relaxed only when the
clerk misleads the defendant through a mistake related to the clerk's official duties. Hanks v.
Rosser, 378 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. 1964).
"4 Kelly Moore Paint Co. v. Northeast Nat'l Bank, 426 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
15 Gracey v. West, 422 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. 1968); French v. Brown, 424 S.W.2d 893 (Tex.
1967); Smith v. Brown & Root, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); Adams v. Adams,
420 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967); Central Airlines, Inc. v. Kahle, 419 S.W.2d 873 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1967), error ref. ,.r.e.
" Payne v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 420 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
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denied was that the complaint as to the amount of the judgment did not
allege a meritorious defense. The distinction seems questionable since a
party, otherwise entitled to equitable relief, is equally injured whether the
label "damages" or "liability" is attached to the judgment.
In an important decision under rule 109, the citation by publication
rule, a court of civil appeals held that the failure of a plaintiff actually to
exercise diligence in locating a defendant, whose whereabouts were alleged
to be unknown, constituted extrinsic fraud authorizing equitable relief
under a bill of review.'" The evidence showing the plaintiff's fraud was
that a search of the deed records on the land involved in the suit would
have revealed an address for one of the more than five hundred parties.
The supreme court held that a plaintiff who makes his jury demand
before the defendant has answered may waive the jury and take a default
judgment" or a judgment nihil dicit" if the defendant should fail to
answer or appear for trial. The non-appearing defendant has no vested
right in the plaintiff's jury demand unless he appears and objects to the
jury waiver. On the other hand, when it is the defendant who makes the
jury demand, his subsequent non-appearance does not give the plaintiff
the right to a non-jury default, and it is necessary to conduct a jury
"prove up.' '20
Dismissal for Want of Prosecution. The appellate decisions for the survey
period indicate that practically anything the trial court does in control-
ling its docket will not be disturbed on appeal. A clear abuse of discretion
must be shown to warrant appellate relief, but two contrasting opinions
found no such abuse in the dismissal of a four-year-old case"' and the
failure to dismiss a fifteen-year-old case." However, a trial court was held
to abuse its discretion when it dismissed a case for want of prosecution
merely upon overruling the plaintiff's motion for continuance. An addi-
tional opportunity to present evidence on the separate issue of dismissal
must be granted so that the court can try the issue of the plaintiff's dili-
gence in prosecuting the case."
Limitations. The supreme court made an important decision regarding
amended pleadings in Leonard v. Texaco, Inc.4 Article 5539b" provides
that amended pleadings, setting up new facts technically amounting to a
new "cause of action," will not subject that party to a plea of limitations
provided the claim, as amended, is not "wholly based upon .. .a new dis-
tinct or different transaction and occurrence." The supreme court, un-
fortunately, had previously refused an application for writ of error in
"7Cowan v. Mason, 428 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
" Green v. W.E. Grace Mfg. Co., 422 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. 1968).
"Mullen v. Roberts, 423 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. 1968).
"Moreno v. Villela Hernandez, 430 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
"Petroleum Ref. Co. v. McGlothlin, 429 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
"Molter v. Equitable Discount Corp., 418 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
2' Oehler v. Oehler, 422 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
24422 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. 1967).
'TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5539b (1958).
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Hopper v. Hargrove," and had thereby resurrected those cases decided
before the passage of article 5539b which followed the strict "cause of
action" concept in applying the statute of limitations to any new pleading
which set forth a different cause of action. In Leonard v. Texaco, Inc. the
supreme court expressly disapproved Hopper v. Hargrove and returned to
the plain language of article 5539b. The court allowed the plaintiff to
shift his theory of recovery from tort to contract, noting that no differ-
ent transaction or occurrence was involved. Two court of civil appeals de-
cisions have already followed Leonard v. Texaco, Inc."
In Vaughn v. Deitz" the supreme court held that the statute of limita-
tions is suspended under the tolling statute" while a defendant is "without
the limits of this State" even though service of process could have been
obtained under the nonresident motorist statute."° The court rejected the
majority view of other jurisdictions which does not recognize any inter-
ruption of the limitation period when substituted service of process is
available. A dissent noted an apparent irrational conflict between the ma-
jority opinion and a court of civil appeals decision"' where it was held that
the tolling statute will not prevent the statute of limitations from running
against a nonresident corporate defendant who is subject to Texas long
arm jurisdiction" for business conducted within the state.
Parties. The attempt to use rule 42, the class action rule, failed in the
only two cases decided under that rule during the year. In the first,
Hughes v. Atlantic Refining Co.," the supreme court held that any claim-
ant to vacant land who is required to be named in a statutory vacancy ap-
plication under article 5421c"' has a sufficient interest to make him a
"necessary party." The court held that "necessary parties" are entitled to
actual notice and that the class action procedure may not be utilized.
In the second, a court of civil appeals found a conflict of interest be-
tween the class and its representative when a group of radiologists at-
tempted to bring a suit for its own benefit as well as for the alleged bene-
fit of Blue Cross policy holders in a dispute regarding billing practices."
It held that such a conflict required the trial court to dismiss the case if
the class representative could not sustain jurisdiction on any other theory.
Several cases of interest arose in domestic relations contexts. In Casper
v. General Insurance Co. of America' the supreme court, in a per curiam
opinion, refused to disturb the holding that a husband is a necessary party
to his wife's workmen's compensation claim, but held that the court of
26154 S.W.2d 978 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), error ref.
2'Benson v. Grace Oil Co., 430 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); Stanficld v. O'Boyle, 421
S.W.2d 745 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), error ref. n.r.e.
28430 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. 1968).
2 9
TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5537 (1958).
sold. art. 2039a (1959).
3' Harris v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 405 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), error
ref. ir.e.
SaTEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (1964).
3a424 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. 1968).
"
4
TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5421c (1962).
"' Group Hosp. Serv., Inc. v. Barrett, 426 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.r.
'6431 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. 1968).
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civil appeals should not have considered the case as one involving funda-
mental error since the appellant had preserved his error in the trial court.
A court of civil appeals upheld the discretion of the trial court to strike
the attempted intervention of an alleged putative wife who was claiming
an interest in the property to be divided in a divorce proceeding."7 An-
other reiterated that 'legislative" domestic relations courts do not have
jurisdiction to adjudicate title disputes between spouses and third parties."8
Pleadings. A forceful dissent in Sherman v. Provident American Ins. Co."'
expressed regret for the supreme court's failure to establish a rule author-
izing Texas courts to disregard sham, vexatious or frivolous pleadings
even when the aggrieved litigant has failed to complain in the trial court.
The majority of the court recognized the frivolity of the patently unten-
able defenses pleaded by the insurance company but held that the plain-
tiff had waived her right to complain by failing to call for a ruling under
rule 90 which provides that every "defect, omission or fault" in a pleading
not brought to the attention of the trial court shall be considered waived.
More noteworthy than the holding of this case is its implication that
Texas courts do indeed have the power and authority to strike sham
pleadings if the aggrieved party takes steps to protect himself. In addition
to a special exception or a motion to strike an aggrieved party could file
interrogatories under rule 168 to obtain the supposed evidence in the
possession of his adversary raising each of the untenable allegations.
In Petroleum Anchor Equipment, Inc. v. Tyra" the supreme court
held that a party's alleged ratification of the act of another, when as-
serted defensively against that party, is an affirmative defense akin to
estoppel and as such must be affirmatively pleaded under rule 94. Ratifi-
cation is not specifically listed in rule 94, but it should now be added to
the other affirmative defenses which are listed in the rule by way of
example.
A court of civil appeals held that the defensive contention that a con-
tractual liquidated damage clause is really a penalty is an affirmative de-
fense which must be specifically pleaded under rule 94."1
In two cases in which the sufficiency of the plaintiff's allegation of
jurisdictional amount was challenged, the supreme court held that po-
tential increases in the claims could not be considered in determining
jurisdiction. In Richardson v. First National Life Insurance Co.4" the su-
preme court held that suit for an accounting asking for "at least" $314.37
did not fall within the jurisdiction of the district court. The accounting
aspects of the suit were not sufficient to invoke the residuary equity juris-
diction of the district court since the county court was empowered to
"'Roberson v. Roberson, 420 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), error ref. n.r.e.
'sBohn v. Bohn, 420 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), error dismissed, following Rose v.
Hatten, 417 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). The court in the instant case held, however, that
the failure to join the third party, a trustee, was not reversible error where the trust had terminated.
3'421 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. 1967).
40419 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. 1967).
"'Smith v. Waite, 424 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.c.
42419 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. 1967).
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handle that aspect of the case. A dissent expressed the fear that upon
further development, the accounting between the parties might reveal a
larger claim above the jurisdiction of the county court, necessitating mul-
tiple litigation. In Universal Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Fields,"
the supreme court held that a potential, but as yet unasserted, counter-
claim for attorney's fees would not take the insurance company's suit to
rescind a $500 life policy out of the jurisdiction of the county court.
Texas pleading practice continues to require the practitioner to strike
a balance between general and specific allegations. Overly detailed plead-
ings may require the submission of more onerous special issues under the
rule that issues should track the pleadings." Overly general pleadings are
subject to a special exception, but may be sufficient to support a judg-
ment nihil dicit"5 or a default judgment," where there is even a mere
attempt to state a cause of action.
The supreme court held that a litigant may prevail upon unpleaded
theories of recovery if his petition alleges the requisite facts. In South-
western Motor Transport v. Valley Weathermakers, Inc.47 the court said:
"While respondent's petition does not present a theory of recovery based
upon the Interstate Commerce Act, the facts pleaded do show a probable
liability under such enactment. For that reason, we have concluded that
the cause should be remanded rather than rendered."4"
In Texas Highvay Dept. v. Jarrell" the supreme court noted an im-
portant and sometimes forgotten distinction between a plea of res judicata,
a plea in abatement and a plea in bar. The court held:
The three pleas have different objectives, and different consequences flow
from their sustention. As applied to a pending claim for relief .. .a plea to
the jurisdiction, if sustained, would require a dismissal; a plea in abatement,
if sustained, would require an abatement of the claim or cause of action until
some obstacle to its further prosecution was removed . . .and a plea in bar,
if sustained, would require a judgment that the claimant take nothing."
Res judicata was held to be a plea in bar.
With respect to amended pleadings, a court of civil appeals held that
the defendant may not file and rely upon a series of supplemental an-
swers when there are no new adversary pleadings filed containing new
matters calling for a reply."
An important decision was written defining the rights of an insured
under a standard automobile policy when the insured is a defendant who
also plans to become a claimant. Beach v. Runnells previously had held
that the insured must assert his claim as a compulsory counterclaim in the
4 422 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. 1967).
4 General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Cornelius, 424 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968),
error ref. n.r.c.
45Gomperts v. Wcndeborn, 427 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
41 Carpenter v. Globe Leasing, Inc., 421 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967); Graham v. San
Antonio Mach. & Supply Corp., 418 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), error ref. n.r.e.
47427 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. 1968).
48ld. at 605.
49418 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. 1967).
"ld. at 488.
"I Home Indem. Co. v. Fuller, 427 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
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original litigation, and that settlement and dismissal effected by his in-
surer cuts off the insured's right of recovery. 2 The court had strong-
ly hinted that the insured, finding himself in such a predicament,
might have a cause of action against his insurer (or even its attorneys).
A court of civil appeals dampened such speculation, at least to the ex-
tent that the insurer effects settlement through the device of a "friendly
suit." The insurer's settlement with the minor plaintiff was carried out
through a suit filed for the purpose of obtaining court approval of the
settlement. The court refused to characterize this as an adversary pro-
ceeding within the meaning of the compulsory counterclaim rule. It
found that the settlement was for the benefit of the insurer, and held
that the insured was free to seek recovery in a separate suit against the
minor. 3 The insurer therefore incurred no liability to its policy holder
since it had not cut off any cause of action owned by the policy holder.
Further comfort for both the potential counterclaimant and his settle-
ment-minded insurer is found in the important case of McGuire v. Com-
mercial Union Insurance Co.5" The supreme court held that the main ac-
tion and the counterclaim may be severed for settlement purposes, and
that after the severance the surviving and unsettled claim is not barred,
prejudiced, or cut off. This common sense approach paves the way for
careful insurance carriers and careful insured-counterclaimants to pre-
serve their rights. However, an insurer must be diligent not to settle too
quickly especially if it knows that its insured wishes to assert a counter-
claim. On the other hand, the insured-counterclaimant seems obligated
to promptly notify his insurer of his intention to file a counterclaim, and
then to file it without unreasonable delay.
On a related subject, another court of civil appeals held that a plain-
tiff's voluntary nonsuit did not have the effect of cutting off an un-
asserted compulsory counterclaim.5 To hold otherwise, of course, would
create a fraudulent device for extinguishing potential liability.
Discovery. The scope of discovery and the sanctions to be employed for
failure to cooperate continue to be controversial subjects. One particularly
heated controversy over the production of income tax returns under rule
167 has already resulted in two trial court dismissals and two separate
appeals (one reaching the supreme court) without being finally resolved.'
The language used by the court of civil appeals in the latest opinion in
that continuing controversy unfortunately invokes the old chestnut that
discovery rules were "never intended to revolutionize practice by allow-
ing 'fishing excursions.' ,.. It is respectfully submitted that the discovery
5.2 379 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964), error ref.
5 3 Brightwell v. Rabeck, 430 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e. The insured
could not seek such recovery in this suit because he had not preserved his appellate complaint against
the other driver.
'4431 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. 1968).
55Serna v. Reyna, 418 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), error ref. n.r.e.
5 Texhoma Stores, Inc. v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 424 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968),
error ref. n.r.e. Prior opinions are at 398 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App.), rev'd, 401 S.W.2d 593
(Tex. 1966).
57424 S.W.2d at 472.
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rules are, in fact, intended to do just that within reasonable limits and
upon a showing of good cause. If discovery were not a "fishing excur-
sion" to some extent there would be no need for it in the first place. In
the instant case, the court of civil appeals reached back to 1945 and to
1939 for federal district court opinions which did not condone fishing ex-
cursions. Not discussed was the 1947 opinion of the United States Supreme
Court in Hickman v. Taylor," which set the stage for the modern era
with its holding: "No longer can the time-honored cry of 'fishing expe-
dition' serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying
his opponent's case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered
by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party
may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his posses-
sion."59
Another civil appeals opinion upheld the trial court's exercise of dis-
cretion in dismissing a suit because a party refused to present himself for
a deposition along with documents properly required by a subpoena duces
tecum. ° The opinion traced the development of the sanctions available
to enforce discovery from the timid days of Knox v. Long"' through rule
215a as it now stands with its interlocking provisions with rule 170, con-
taining express authority (among other sanctions) to issue an order "dis-
missing the action or proceeding or any part thereof.""2
In a case of first impression in Texas, a court of civil appeals rejected
the concept of "continuing interrogatories" under rule 168."2 The defend-
ant served an interrogatory upon the plaintiff asking the names of: "Any
of the doctors you have seen since August 8, 1963 in regard to the injury
you claim you sustained on August 8, 1963." ' Shortly before trial the
plaintiff, without amending his answer to the interrogatory, saw another
doctor who testified at the trial over the defendant's objection that he
was surprised by the testimony. The court rejected defendant's argument
that "once you ask a question by way of interrogatory . . . such a ques-
tion is a continuing one that must be answered truthfully from the time
it is served until the trial has been concluded."" It held instead that rule
168 interrogatories only require one set of answers, although the rule does
not limit the number of times the same question can be re-asked.
In a case of first impression, a court of civil appeals held that the sig-
nature of a deponent is a matter of form." Its omission constitutes a mere
irregularity, and if the deposition is on file for a full day before trial in
compliance with rule 212, the defect cannot be attacked after the trial
58329 U.S. 495 (1947).
59 Id. at 507.
10 Fisher v. Continental 111. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 424 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
61 152 Tex. 291, 257 S.W.2d 289 (1953) (based upon old Tex. R. Civ. P. 202).
" It is respectfully submitted that the "no nonsense" policy of cases such as Fisher v. Con-
tinental I11. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 424 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), goes a long way
toward earning the state courts the same respect which the federal courts generally enjoy in the
field of discovery.
'3Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Mitchell, 423 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
64Id. at 415.
65 Id.
66 Bankers Multiple Line Ins. Co. v. Gordon, 422 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
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has commenced. A later case independently reached the same conclusion
and held an admission made by a party during a deposition is admissible
against him even though he fails to sign the deposition."
A court of civil appeals held that the plaintiff's failure to use the depo-
sition of the defendant at the trial was not a cause to tax the cost of the
deposition against the prevailing plaintiff."8 In another deposition case, the
court of civil appeals held it was unnecessary for a party to show that a
witness is physically unable to testify in order to use his deposition."9
Answers to requests for admissions under rule 169 may not be con-
troverted or reneged upon by an inconsistent affidavit filed in opposition
to a motion for summary judgment." Also, requests for admissions may
not be evaded, and will be deemed admitted where the responding party
refuses to answer upon the erroneous excuse that he has been called upon
to admit a conclusion of law.7
Venue. Venue continues as one of the most prolific sources of the Texas
appellate caseload. So highly developed is the case law already that there
is little likelihood of a new thought or procedural theory. Gross negli-
gence had never before been relied upon to sustain venue under subdivi-
sion 9a, but predictably, when the opportunity arose it was held that
since ordinary negligence is sufficient to sustain venue in the county where
an accident occurred, gross negligence is likewise sufficient.
Houston, like Amarillo, now spreads into more than one county, and
written instruments executed after 1965 (when the city annexed land in
Fort Bend and Montgomery counties) must specify payment in that por-
tion of Houston which is in Harris County in order to sustain venue
there under subdvision 5."
A plaintiff cannot be expected to controvert a plea of privilege until he
actually receives a copy of the plea or until it is served upon him as pre-
scribed by rules 21b and 86. Therefore, it is reversible error to act upon
a plea of privilege within the first ten days after it is served upon the
plaintiff."
Two courts of civil appeals reached opposite conclusions concerning
the duties of a trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law
for use in a venue appeal. In each case the findings were properly re-
quested but were not filed. One court affirmed, holding: "[W]e must
assume the trial court found every issuable fact in support of the judg-
ment . . . ."" The other court reversed, holding: "The judgment may
" Rowntree v. Rice, 426 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
" Cain v. Fontana, 423 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), error ref. n.r.e.
"9Carpenter v. Tinney, 420 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
7 Houston Shoe Hosp. v. State, 423 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
7 Hill Farm Inc. v. Hill County, 425 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error granted;
Lowe v. Texas Dept. of Public Safety, 423 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
See also Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 756 (1968).
72 FWA Drilling Co. v. Lambert, 418 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), error dismissed.
"Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Shipley, 400 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. 1966); Piano v. Gulf Coast Inv.
Corp., 429 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error dismissed.
14 Ross v. Katy Employees Credit Union, 430 S.W.2d 49 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
'5Falfurrias Creamery Co. v. Sanders, 426 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
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not be supported upon appeal by a presumption of finding upon any
ground of recovery or defense, no element of which has been found by
the trial Court.""
A case of first impression arose when two lawyers, each owning a joint
interest in an attorney's fee, sought to maintain venue in the county
where the client had agreed in writing to pay, even though the agreement
only named one of the lawyers. The joint interest of the plaintiffs, along
with the policy sometimes called the "Middlebrook doctrine"" of avoiding
multiplicity of litigation, was held sufficient to allow the unnamed obligee
to maintain venue under the written agreement." The court of civil ap-
peals said: "If the policy of the law requires a plaintiff having multiple
claims against the defendant to sue on all of them in one action, to avoid
multiplicity of suits, [the Middlebrook doctrine] then in our opinion that
same public policy would require multiple plaintiffs owning jointly one
indivisible claim to sue thereon in one action.""
In a domestic relations case the defendant is in danger of waiving his
plea of privilege if he asks for any affirmative relief upon the preliminary
or temporary matters to be determined by the court. A defendant in a
child custody case was held to have waived his venue rights by filing a
motion asking for a juvenile investigation without taking the precaution
to make his motion "subject to" his plea of privilege. "° However, another
opinion adopted a more liberal philosophy, holding that an appearance
and agreement for a continuance with an extension of the life of a tem-
porary custody order did not waive a plea of privilege." The latter result
seems preferable because: "Venue relates to a trial upon its merits, and
not merely to interlocutory orders that have no relation to an issue of
law or fact, going to the merits of the case.""
Special Issues. The task of determining the scope and the precise wording
of special issues is an anathema to the trial lawyer, and a frustration to
the trial judge. Each may expect to have his work tested by frequent ap-
peals. It is speculative at best whether the wording of an evidentiary or a
multifarious issue may actually influence or mislead jurors into returning
verdicts which otherwise would not be rendered. "3
Nevertheless, we continue to view the jury's capabilities from two com-
pletely inconsistent viewpoints. During the presentation of evidence and
," Allan Constr. Co. v. Soliz, 421 S.W.2d 423, 426 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), error dismissed.
7 Middlebrook v. David Bradley Mfg. Co., 86 Tex. 706, 26 S.W. 935 (1894).
,8 Roberts v. Dunn, 426 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
7 Id. at 275.
80Srader v. Story, 419 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), error dismissed.
81 Green v. Green, 424 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
'2 Id. at 482.
8a But a jury instruction is not abracadabra. It is not a magical incantation, the
slightest deviation from which will break the spell. Only its poorer examples are
formalistic codes recited by a trial judge to please appellate masters. At its best,
it is simple, rugged communication from a trial judge to a jury of ordinary people,
entitled to be appraised in terms of its net effect. Instructions are to be viewed in
this commonsense perspective, and not through the remote and distorting knothole
of a distant appellate force.
From the dissent in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 418 (1967).
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the argument of counsel the jury is theoretically so gullible and sus-
ceptible to deception that strict rules regulate the offer and admission of
evidence and the remarks of counsel. For example, the jury is thought to
be so incapable of discernment that it is not even allowed to hear, much
less to evaluate, any hearsay evidence. Argument regarding liability in-
surance is thought to be much too dangerous for the unsophisticated jury
to handle. Conversely, in reading and precisely deciphering the court's
charge, the jury theoretically becomes so intelligent and acutely perceptive
that a flaw in the language of an issue or an instruction will cause a cor-
responding flaw which will be carried forward and reflected by the jury's
finding." Obviously the truth lies somewhere in between these views.
The cases continue to divide themselves between those favoring greater
fragmentation with a narrower scope of inquiry for each issue, and those
permitting or even advocating an increase in the scope of any given issue
with a corresponding decrease in the number of issues submitted. In J. A.
Robinson Sons, Inc. v. Wigart" the supreme court required a special issue
to be as narrow, precise and specific as it could conceivably be drawn.
The outcome depended upon which of two defendants would be held
under respondeat superior for the negligent act of an alleged loaned serv-
ant, Chester W. Britain. The trial court submitted an issue asking: "Do
you find from a preponderance of the evidence that on the occasion in
question Chester W. Britain was not a special or loaned employee of [the
defendant]?"" The supreme court held that the phrase "on the occasion
in question" was not sufficiently specific to direct the jury's attention to
the accident made the basis of the suit. The court sustained the peti-
tioner's objection by holding that:
The issue as submitted, while using the phrase 'at the time of the accident in
question,' is capable of varying interpretations, and particularly of such a
broad interpretation as to include his general activities in connection with his
general duties on the premises of J. A. Robinson Sons, whereas the inquiry
to the jury should be limited and restricted to his actual activity involved in
the specific operation of removing or shaking off the metal shed at the very
time of the accident in question."
Broader issues were approved in civil appeals cases. A single issue was
approved for inquiring: (1) as to the total amount of all of the plain-
tiff's damage for medical services, hospital services, and medicine; "s (2)
whether a minor driver was "reckless and incompetent;" 9 (3) whether a
defendant made a "proper application" of his brakes."
It remains important to be careful to make a legally sufficient objec-
tion to the submission of a special issue. Not uncommon is the objection
that an issue constitutes a "general charge." What the objecting party is
84 This paradox is more fully explored in Smith, The Hearsay Rule and the Docket Crisis: The
Futile Search for Paradise, 54 A.B.A.J. 231 (1968).
85431 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. 1968).
S8Id. at 332 (emphasis added).
87Id. at 333.
"Tex. Gen. Indem. Co. v. Hancock, 422 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
9 Broesche v. Bullock, 427 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
"Richardson v. Henderson, 424 S.W.2d 510 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
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usually driving at is that the issue is too broad. However, the "general
charge" objection is a meaningless generality and should not be made
when the trial court is in fact using at least some sort of special issues."
In a case of first impression, a court of civil appeals held that a party
in whose favor an issue has been answered is not precluded from later
claiming that there was insufficient evidence to warrant the submission
of the issue if it should ultimately turn out to serve his purpose to do
92
so.
Summary Judgment. The utility of the summary judgment procedure
as a judicial housekeeping tool at the trial court level is offset, to some
extent, by the high incidence of appeals. The appellate volume in this
area may be due in part to the fact that the record is usually less expen-
sive because no statement of facts is required, and because the bulk of
other court costs, such as deposition expense, have already been incurred.
Nevertheless, the summary judgment procedure is effective and efficient
when invoked before a trial judge with the perception to know whether
it is the material or the immaterial facts which are controverted.
The mechanics of the Texas summary judgment procedure are becom-
ing highly refined and no less highly technical. A court may not take
judicial notice of its own records in another case, but is required to have
certified copies of those same records before it in order to consider them
in connection with a motion for summary judgment." On the other
hand, the record from a prior trial in the same case may be considered."
A transcript of the proceedings before an administrative board is inad-
missible, even though properly authenticated by a court reporter."3 A dep-
osition from a different case containing an admission of the party resist-
ing the motion for summary judgment is ordinarily not competent sum-
mary judgment evidence, but it is made competent if qualified as an ac-
curate record of the prior testimony by requests for admissions under
rule 169."9 An affidavit containing summaries of records maintained by a
state agency are insufficient since certified copies of the records themselves
are required."
The time for presenting a motion for summary judgment is not con-
fined solely to the pre-trial stage. In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Smith,"'
the supreme court held it was even proper for the trial court to consider
a motion for summary judgment after having heard the evidence at a
trial on the merits, overruled the same party's motion for instructed ver-
dict, and submitted the case to a hung jury."
9" Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Jones, 427 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
" Saper v. Rodgers, 418 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), error ref. n.r.e.
"3Cook v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 418 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
94 Austin Bldg. Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 432 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. 1968).
"
5 Cruz v. City of San Antonio, 424 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
"9Watson v. Godwin, 425 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
9 Lowe v. Texas Dept. of Public Safety, 423 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref.
n.r.e.
9'428 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. 1968).
" Although it is not discussed in the court's per curiam opinion, this practice is analogous to,
and serves the same purpose as, the practice under federal rule 50(b) which allows a party to
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In a case where the motion was made in the pre-trial stage, a court
of civil appeals held that a trial court may render a summary judgment
before ruling upon special exceptions directed toward the pleadings of the
party against whom the summary judgment is rendered."
The function and effect of pleadings in a summary judgment proceed-
ing are being minimized. A court of civil appeals held: "Where the mo-
tion for summary judgment rests upon extrinsic evidence which demon-
strates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, a failure of
the pleadings to fully allege the basis of recovery, not challenged at or
prior to the hearing by special exception or otherwise, will be disregarded
in harmony with Rule 67, T.R.C.P."'O'
In the same liberal vein, the supreme court held that a court is not
limited to the ground stated in the motion if there are other grounds
which make summary judgment appropriate as a matter of law."2
Although the motion and answer are "summary judgment compon-
ents," it is the affidavits which determine the existence, if any, of a fact
controversy;'0 ' a sworn pleading may itself be a sufficient affidavit in op-
position to a motion for summary judgment,' but it is unlikely that many
pleadings will meet the rigorous requirement that statements in a sum-
mary judgment affidavit "be so worded that if given on the witness stand
they would be admissible in evidence....5 One questionable opinion con-
cluded that the filing of a general denial is what raises fact questions pre-
venting summary judgment in a negligence case.' This result is correct,
but the real reason seems to be that the existence of negligence is itself a
fact question which prevents summary judgment rather than any special
quality of the general denial.
A trial court should be careful to preserve procedural fairness in ac-
cepting or rejecting affidavits filed in support of a motion for summary
judgment. It is error for a court to permit the filing of such an affidavit
in support of a motion for summary judgment on the same day the mo-
tion is granted so as to deprive the opponent of an opportunity to file an
affidavit in opposition."'7 It is equally erroneous to strike an affidavit upon
oral motion of one party without granting the other leave to file an
amended affidavit. 8
The affidavits of interested witnesses and experts are often held to be in-
conclusive, merely raising fact questions."' However, some cases recog-
re-urge his motion for directed verdict within ten days after the jury has been discharged if no
verdict is returned.
""'Griffin v. H.L. Peterson Co., 427 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), expressly overruling
Wilson v. Mitchell, 299 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957), to the extent it may be interpreted
as conflicting with this holding.
'o' Gallagher v. City of Brownsville, 429 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
"'City of Fort Worth v. Taylor, 427 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. 1968).
".. Phillips v. Suntex Oil & Gas Co., 419 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), error ref. n.r.e.
... Pine v. Gibralter Say. Ass'n, 427 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
''Tobin v. Garcia, 159 Tex. 58, 316 S.W.2d 396 (1958).
'0' Mabry Foundry & Mach. Co. v. Howard Motor Co., 422 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
"'°Estes v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 421 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
"°SStuart v. Stuart, 429 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
'°gCallan v. Bartlett Elec. Co-operative, 423 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref.
n.r.e.; Jones v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 420 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), error ref. n.r.e.
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nize an exception to this rule when the testimony of the interested wit-
ness "is not contradicted by any other witness or by attendant circum-
stances and is clear, direct, positive and free from inaccuracies and cir-
cumstances tending to cast suspicion thereon.""... The determination of
when the testimony meets the tests of clarity, directness, etc., is so sub-
jective that a reviewing court is left with a free hand to do almost any-
thing it desires in affirming or reversing. Such a fluid concept does not
seem entirely desirable. The supreme court may soon supply more definite
guidelines for evaluating the conclusiveness of expert testimony."'
The value of the partial summary judgment procedure is, of course,
that it removes from the controversy those issues over which there can be
no reasonable dispute. Thus, a court of civil appeals held that once an
interlocutory summary judgment as to liability is granted, the issues so
decided may not be further contested in the trial on the remaining issues
unless the summary judgment is first specifically set aside by the court:.
Jury Misconduct. New rule 226a, effective January 1, 1967, sets out ad-
monitory jury instructions which, in part, tell the jury not to consider in-
surance and informs the jurors that they need not reveal matters which
occurred during their deliberations after being discharged from service.
In three appellate decisions which have dealt with the rule to date, the
holding was that the instructions do not bring about any procedural or
substantive changes, other than the requirement of reading of the in-
structions themselves. At least one juror's affidavit showing jury miscon-
duct is still necessary before the trial court is required to hear evidence of
misconduct occurring during the deliberations, despite the fact that jur-
ors may now be less likely to sign an affidavit after being informed that
they are not required to do so." ' An attorney's hearsay affidavit does not
suffice."'
Probable harm must still be shown if the jury discusses insurance even
though its discussion violates the court's instruction under rule 226a."'
A somewhat disquieting case held that a party's brother is not a "per-
son who might be connected with or interested in the case" as defined in
rule 226a, so that no misconduct was shown by a juror's solicitation of a
ride from the brother who had been present in the courtroom while the
trial was in progress."' The appearance of impropriety was certainly pres-
ent and although the encounter may have been innocent, it seems that
any normal juror would be at least subtly influenced by such a favor.
Appellate Procedure. Despite the supposed "liberal construction""' of the
"'Melody v. Texas Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 421 S.W.2d 693, 695 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967),
and cases therein cited.
"' Bond v. Snow, 422 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), error granted.
"'City of Houston v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 421 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), error
ref. n.r.e.
"' Walker v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 425 S.W.2d 462 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
". Washington v. Griffin, 427 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
n"Butler v. Haynes, 426 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
116 Hunnicutt v. Clark, 428 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
" TEx. R. CIrv. P. 1.
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rules, strict compliance with them continues to be required in performing
the steps necessary to perfect an appeal. For example, the supreme court
approved two civil appeals decisions which held that an attorney's letter
to the clerk inquiring as to the amount of an appeal cost bond will not
suffice as a notice of appeal.11
Rule 377(c) seems to sanction the use of a partial statement of facts.
However, an attorney making use of the rule must be careful that he
does not intend to appeal on no evidence or insufficient evidence grounds,
or the rule will prove to be a trap. In Englander Co. v. Kennedy... the
supreme court held that "[w]ith only a partial statement of facts before
us we must presume that there was evidence to support the court's find-
ings.""' Contrary interpretations of rule 377(c) were disapproved.
The omission from the record of what may seem like insignificant mat-
ters at the time the appeal is perfected may be fatal. The failure to bring
up a hospital record admitted as an exhibit prevents consideration of the
appellant's remittitur points.' If blackboard diagrams, commonly used in
automobile cases, are not a part of the appellate record, the appellate court
is warranted in applying the usual presumptions resulting from an in-
complete statement of facts."2 A practical solution might be to take po-
laroid snapshots during a recess and to introduce them as exhibits. Even a
duplicate drawing on a sheet of paper, if reasonable and accurate, would
serve the purpose. The timeliness of a request to the court reporter to pre-
pare a statements of facts may be determined with greater liberality than
was assumed previous to Patterson v. Hall.1" In that case the supreme
court held that a delay of twenty-four days between the notice of appeal
and the order for the statement of facts did not necessarily show a lack
of diligence. The court directed the court of civil appeals to make a fac-
tual determination of the promptness shown under the existing circum-
stances.
"Good cause" for an extension of time to file a statement of facts was
shown where the failure to obtain opposing counsel's approval of the
statement of facts was caused by the opponent's absence on a vacation."'
In one case" a bill of exceptions was filed in the trial court on the
fifty-first day after the overruling of the motion for new trial, one day
later than the period allowed except on a showing of good cause."' The
supreme court held that the bill must be considered by the court of civil
appeals if filed within the sixty-day period for filing the transcript."7
In an important decision, the supreme court held that points of error
raised in a motion for new trial are not waived if the appellant decides
8 -'Werner v. Murray, 430 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Ci'. App. 1968), error ref.; Standard Ins. Co.
v. Teague Brick & Tile Co., 425 S.W.2d 63 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref.
"'.428 S.W.2d 806 (1968).
'"Id. at 806.
... Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Sparks, 424 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
". Garza v. Guevara, 421 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
123 430 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. 1968).
124Richey v. C.R.I. & P. Ry., 420 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), error ref. n.r.e.
"' Robinson v. Crump, 427 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. 1968).




not to obtain a ruling upon the motion or if the trial court, through in-
action, allows the motion to be overruled by operation of law."28 Not ob-
taining a ruling may be good strategy if the appellant is confident of
reversal and rendition in the appellate court and fears that the trial court
might grant a new trial after originally rendering judgment for the op-
ponent.
An order purporting to overrule a motion for new trial which has al-
ready been overruled by operation of law is a nullity. Thus an appeal
bond filed within thirty days after the void order but later than thirty
days after the motion was overruled by operation of law was filed too
late to preserve appellate jurisdiction. '29
An interesting conflict exists between two civil appeals decisions as to
the effect of recitations of fact in a judgment. One opinion holds that the
recitations are mere surplusage which may be disregarded.'" The other
holds that the facts recited in the judgment take the place of formal find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law. 1
Three supreme court cases expressed and followed the court's policy of
passing upon points of law which were not decided by the court of civil
appeals to determine if its judgment may be affirmed upon those points
when it may not be affirmed on the grounds announced by the court of
civil appeals.'
Miscellaneous. A judgment creditor probably does not have the right to
force the debtor to make repeated appearances at periodic intervals under
a bill of discovery proceeding under rule 737. A court of civil appeals
side-stepped the issue and denied the relief by noting that only the credi-
tor's motion for judgment, and not his pleadings asked for this relief.'
It is too late to challenge a juror for cause after standing by and learn-
ing the result of the opponent's peremptory challenges.'
One civil appeals decision ' reverted to the rule in Ford v. Carpenter"
in holding that it is necessary for a party to move for a mistrial in order
to preserve his right to appeal upon the ground of prejudicial misconduct
of opposing counsel. Apparently unnoticed was the fact that Ford v.
Carpenter has been expressly overruled in Condra Funeral Home v. Rol-
lin,' 7 which held: "Now, surely no party should be required to seek a mis-
trial because of an error committed against him at a time when the 'whole
record' has not yet been made and it is therefore impossible for either him
121 Moore v. Mauldin, 428 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1968).
1' Flowers v. Muse, 427 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref.
"'O°Robinson v. Faulkner, 422 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), error ref. n.r.e.
' General Air Conditioning Co. v. Third Ward Church of Christ, 418 S.W.2d 839 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1967), rev'd on olier grounds, 426 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. 1968).
132McConnell Constr. Co. v. Insurance Co. of St. Louis, 428 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. 1968); Leonard
v. Texaco, Inc., 422 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. 1967); Bildon Farms, Inc. v. Ward County Water Improve-
ment Dist. No. 2, 415 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. 1967).
"'Trevino v. Graves, 418 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
114 Ratcliff v. Bruce, 423 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
"a'Cain v. Zurich Ins. Co., 426 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
125 147 Tex. 447, 216 S.W.2d 558 (1949).
'3 158 Tex. 478, 314 S.W.2d 277 (1958).
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or the trial court to know whether it will finally appear that it probably
caused an improper judgment......
A civil appeals decision has at least tacitly approved a plaintiff's voir
dire examination of the jury which explored the prospective jurors' con-
nections, directly or through family or friends, with the "insurance in-
dustry."'39 The court held that an examination limited to a good faith
inquiry into significant insurance connections does not draw attention to
casualty insurance as distinguished from other types of insurance, and is
not in itself prejudicial.
"'Id. at 280.
"' South Austin Drive-In Theatre v. Thomison, 421 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), error
ref. n.r.e.
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